I’ve
been reading G. K. Chesterton’s remarkable developmental memoir, Orthodoxy. I call it a developmental memoir because it
is a sort of blend between a coming of age and spiritual memoirs. The purpose of the book, as Chesterton says
in the preface, is “to attempt an explanation, not of whether the Christian
Faith can be believed, but of how he personally has come to believe it.” Since the book’s discourse is expository in
nature—with perhaps a dash of argument—it stands manifestly self-explanatory,
so there isn’t much literary analysis for me to present. The only analysis I could comment on is in
the ideas, and one can find lots of commentary on that. I don’t see what my thoughts could add. Be it suffice that from what I have read, I
am in total agreement. Chesterton is
what I would call a natural, small “c” conservative, and by that I mean
irrespective of political positions. A
natural conservative, in my perception, is a person who has an inherent
inclination toward seeing the past and established societal conditions as
natural and just, and the traditional culture as normative.
For
this “Lines I Wished I’d Written” post, I take three paragraphs from his fourth
chapter, “The Ethics of Elfland.” Here he
develops his boyhood understanding of the world as being charged with magic, a
wonder that “became [his] sentiment towards the whole world.”
The
first quote touches on the “instinct” of childhood “astonishment.
This elementary wonder,
however, is not a mere fancy derived from the fairy tales; on the contrary, all
the fire of the fairy tales is derived from this. Just as we all like love
tales because there is an instinct of sex, we all like astonishing tales because
they touch the nerve of the ancient instinct of astonishment. This is proved by
the fact that when we are very young children we do not need fairy tales: we
only need tales. Mere life is interesting enough. A child of seven is excited
by being told that Tommy opened a door and saw a dragon. But a child of three
is excited by being told that Tommy opened a door. Boys like romantic tales;
but babies like realistic tales--because they find them romantic. In fact, a
baby is about the only person, I should think, to whom a modern realistic novel
could be read without boring him. This proves that even nursery tales only echo
an almost pre-natal leap of interest and amazement. These tales say that apples
were golden only to refresh the forgotten moment when we found that they were
green. They make rivers run with wine only to make us remember, for one wild
moment, that they run with water. I have said that this is wholly reasonable
and even agnostic. And, indeed, on this point I am all for the higher agnosticism;
its better name is Ignorance. We have all read in scientific books, and,
indeed, in all romances, the story of the man who has forgotten his name. This
man walks about the streets and can see and appreciate everything; only he
cannot remember who he is. Well, every man is that man in the story. Every man
has forgotten who he is. One may understand the cosmos, but never the ego; the
self is more distant than any star. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God; but thou
shalt not know thyself. We are all under the same mental calamity; we have all
forgotten our names. We have all forgotten what we really are. All that we call
common sense and rationality and practicality and positivism only means that
for certain dead levels of our life we forget that we have forgotten. All that
we call spirit and art and ecstacy only means that for one awful instant we
remember that we forget.
All
quotes taken from Literature Network’s entry of Orthodoxy. http://www.online-literature.com/chesterton/orthodoxy/
In
the second quoted paragraph Chesterton takes the child’s sense of astonishment
and brands it a philosophy.
For this reason (we may
call it the fairy godmother philosophy) I never could join the young men of my
time in feeling what they called the general sentiment of revolt. I should have
resisted, let us hope, any rules that were evil, and with these and their definition
I shall deal in another chapter. But I did not feel disposed to resist any rule
merely because it was mysterious. Estates are sometimes held by foolish forms,
the breaking of a stick or the payment of a peppercorn: I was willing to hold
the huge estate of earth and heaven by any such feudal fantasy. It could not
well be wilder than the fact that I was allowed to hold it at all. At this
stage I give only one ethical instance to show my meaning. I could never mix in
the common murmur of that rising generation against monogamy, because no
restriction on sex seemed so odd and unexpected as sex itself. To be allowed,
like Endymion, to make love to the moon and then to complain that Jupiter kept
his own moons in a harem seemed to me (bred on fairy tales like Endymion's) a
vulgar anti-climax. Keeping to one woman is a small price for so much as seeing
one woman. To complain that I could only be married once was like complaining
that I had only been born once. It was incommensurate with the terrible excitement
of which one was talking. It showed, not an exaggerated sensibility to sex, but
a curious insensibility to it. A man is a fool who complains that he cannot
enter Eden by five gates at once. Polygamy is a lack of the realization of sex;
it is like a man plucking five pears in mere absence of mind. The aesthetes
touched the last insane limits of language in their eulogy on lovely things.
The thistledown made them weep; a burnished beetle brought them to their knees.
Yet their emotion never impressed me for an instant, for this reason, that it
never occurred to them to pay for their pleasure in any sort of symbolic
sacrifice. Men (I felt) might fast forty days for the sake of hearing a
blackbird sing. Men might go through fire to find a cowslip. Yet these lovers
of beauty could not even keep sober for the blackbird. They would not go
through common Christian marriage by way of recompense to the cowslip. Surely
one might pay for extraordinary joy in ordinary morals. Oscar Wilde said that
sunsets were not valued because we could not pay for sunsets. But Oscar Wilde
was wrong; we can pay for sunsets. We can pay for them by not being Oscar
Wilde.
And
finally in the third quoted paragraph Chesterton takes that personal philosophic
position and projects it toward the universal.
All the towering
materialism which dominates the modern mind rests ultimately upon one
assumption; a false assumption. It is supposed that if a thing goes on
repeating itself it is probably dead; a piece of clockwork. People feel that if
the universe was personal it would vary; if the sun were alive it would dance.
This is a fallacy even in relation to known fact. For the variation in human
affairs is generally brought into them, not by life, but by death; by the dying
down or breaking off of their strength or desire. A man varies his movements
because of some slight element of failure or fatigue. He gets into an omnibus
because he is tired of walking; or he walks because he is tired of sitting
still. But if his life and joy were so gigantic that he never tired of going to
Islington, he might go to Islington as regularly as the Thames goes to
Sheerness. The very speed and ecstasy of his life would have the stillness of
death. The sun rises every morning. I do not rise every morning; but the
variation is due not to my activity, but to my inaction. Now, to put the matter
in a popular phrase, it might be true that the sun rises regularly because he
never gets tired of rising. His routine might be due, not to a lifelessness,
but to a rush of life. The thing I mean can be seen, for instance, in children,
when they find some game or joke that they specially enjoy. A child kicks his
legs rhythmically through excess, not absence, of life. Because children have
abounding vitality, because they are in spirit fierce and free, therefore they
want things repeated and unchanged. They always say, "Do it again";
and the grown-up person does it again until he is nearly dead. For grown-up
people are not strong enough to exult in monotony. But perhaps God is strong
enough to exult in monotony. It is possible that God says every morning,
"Do it again" to the sun; and every evening, "Do it again"
to the moon. It may not be automatic necessity that makes all daisies alike; it
may be that God makes every daisy separately, but has never got tired of making
them. It may be that He has the eternal appetite of infancy; for we have sinned
and grown old, and our Father is younger than we. The repetition in Nature may
not be a mere recurrence; it may be a theatrical encore. Heaven may encore the
bird who laid an egg. If the human being conceives and brings forth a human
child instead of bringing forth a fish, or a bat, or a griffin, the reason may
not be that we are fixed in an animal fate without life or purpose. It may be
that our little tragedy has touched the gods, that they admire it from their
starry galleries, and that at the end of every human drama man is called again
and again before the curtain. Repetition may go on for millions of years, by
mere choice, and at any instant it may stop. Man may stand on the earth
generation after generation, and yet each birth be his positively last
appearance.
That
image of a child kicking his legs rhythmically as a metaphor for God is
rhetorical brilliance!
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